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It’s common in academic circles to distinguish between positive arguments
(which describe things as they are) and normative arguments (which prescribe
the way things ought to be). The distinction dissolves as soon as accounts of
how the world works spill over into justifications for the status quo. That
happens a lot, especially in discussions of theory. It happens again in David
Strauss’ wonderful monograph.1 Strauss offers a succinct exposition of the
constitutional system we actually observe, coupled with a powerful
explanation of how and why the scheme functions as it does and genuine
reassurance that, on the whole, we can and should be satisfied.
I am convinced Strauss has all this about right. In the main, I come to praise
him. I will make this clear in Part I. We have a living Constitution. We make
it up as we go along, according to a frame of reference that both enables and
curbs our appetite for change and, into the bargain, holds us together as a
people. I do have reservations about some aspects of his case, though, and I
will sketch them in Part II. I also wonder what implications Strauss’ theory
may have for a purely normative question he doesn’t address – namely, how an
original document should be drafted for the purpose of fostering a living
Constitution over time. I offer some thoughts along those lines in Part III.
I
Legal theorists can’t muddle along like real people, operating within the
constitutional system, never pausing to reflect on the whole of which they and
their actions are a part. Theorists are supposed to explain stuff. They are
supposed to connect the dots, or at least to try. Professor Strauss carries this
burden as well as anyone writing in the field today. He imposes no deep
philosophical concepts on the Constitution; he reads no contested political
values into it. Instead, he offers a down-to-earth, objective, and above all wise
appraisal of what we are doing and where we may be going. His analysis
entails all the judgment, humility, and caution he associates with the common
law method on which, in his view, we rely for the living Constitution.
The first hundred pages of this book are a tour de force. Strauss initially
identifies the challenges the Constitution poses for the evolving American
society. He next demolishes the appeal of originalism as a plausible account of
our national experience – originalism, at least, in any of its familiar forms. He
∗
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then introduces common law methodology as a theoretical explanation that
better fits the facts. His treatment is sophisticated, yet free of legal jargon (and
distracting citations) that can discourage even serious readers. To make his
case even more accessible to a general audience, Strauss illustrates the
common law method at work in two celebrated contexts – the Supreme Court’s
incremental development of now-settled principles touching free speech and
racial equality. This is a masterful academic achievement. I would not have
dreamed that so much crucial ground could be covered so economically
without sacrificing accuracy.
II
Persuaded as I am by Professor Strauss’ primary argument that we have a
living, common law Constitution, I have some (modest) concerns about his
additional arguments in chapter 5. There, he contends that the historical,
documentary Constitution is “as important as the living Constitution of
precedents and traditions.”2
I must say I’m not sure how this can be so, given that common law
methodology does the heavy lifting. Strauss plainly doesn’t credit any notion
that the written Constitution is entitled to respect because of its origins. With
Jefferson, he dismisses any claim that we are bound to follow decisions made
by somebody else a long time ago – because they were smarter than we are or
because they asserted an authority to rule us centuries later. Certainly, Strauss
rejects the idea that the document enjoys democratic bona fides. Even if the
1789 document was adopted democratically (it wasn’t, of course, but even if it
was), we would not be obliged to give it priority over a statute our own
generation sees fit to enact. Originalists can contend that the historical
document is a higher law for these reasons. But Strauss can’t – and doesn’t.
In the event, Strauss says this: “[O]ur adherence to the written Constitution
does not have to depend on veneration of our ancestors or on any
acknowledgment of their right to rule us from the grave. The written
Constitution is valuable because it provides a common ground among the
American people.”3 This common ground consists of at least some, and
perhaps numerous, specific decisions that the document makes well enough to
command consensus support – well enough to leave alone. There are two
ideas here. One is that the document on display at the National Archives is the
Constitution, providing the text to which we must subscribe. The other is that
the written Constitution has genuine value for us today.
It may be that this document summons enough general agreement about
enough specific questions to form the common ground of which Strauss
speaks. I will come to that in a minute. But our current (implicit) endorsement
of choices the document makes with particularity doesn’t necessarily entail
acceptance of the document as a whole as the Constitution. After all, we also
2
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agree on specific provisions in other writings. I dare say the Massachusetts
Traffic Code declares somewhere that when an operator is traveling on a twoway street, he or she should ordinarily bear to the right; that when two vehicles
meet at an unmarked crossroads, the one to the right gets to pull away first; and
that the speed limit along unmarked stretches of the Southeast Expressway in
Boston is 55 mph. None of these decisions is objectively correct, but we
accept them because they reasonably settle points that otherwise would require
endless, wasteful debate. Well, maybe not the speed limit. The point is that if
agreement on tolerable particulars is what makes a document the Constitution,
the one under glass isn’t the only candidate.
We, or most of us, do embrace the amended 1789 document as the
Constitution. Strauss says that “[a]llegiance to the [written] Constitution, and a
certain kind of respect for the founding and for crucial episodes in our history,
seem, to many people, central to what it is to be an American.”4 He doesn’t
mean that we should be patient with strong views honestly held, even if those
views rest on a fundamental misconception. In this passage, as I understand it,
he means that the public accepts this document as the Constitution, and no
further grounds for legitimacy need be considered. Other theorists take
essentially the same view.5 Maybe Henry Monaghan put it best: the authority
of this document is “our master rule of recognition.”6 We agree that this is the
document; let’s move on.
I am content with this answer. Questioning what everybody takes to be the
starting place risks trivializing the serious conversation we are trying to have.
So I agree, you will be reassured to hear, that the Mass Traffic Code is not the
United States Constitution. I hasten to say, though, that I would be more
comfortable embracing the 1789 document as our foundation if it were, shall
we say, more foundational.
Turn to the second idea in Strauss’ explanation for why we adhere to the
written Constitution – namely its value as the source of a common ground that
holds us together. According to Strauss, this common ground is pointedly not
to be found in the capacious textual formulations that are typically linked to
our most heralded aspirations – due process of law, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of expression, and like assurances of individual liberty and
dignity.7 Those aspects of the written Constitution have consensus support
only at a level of generality that drains them of any real decision-making
significance. They are the protean matters from which the living Constitution
develops.8 Nor is common ground located in the document’s structural
4
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allocations of governmental power – the separate federal executive, the
bicameral federal legislature, the independent judiciary, and individual states
with some measure of autonomy. And it is not in the provisions that envision
elections and thus some manner of democratic self-government. Those, too,
are elements of the written Constitution on which the living Constitution
builds.
The common ground Strauss has in mind lies in far less salient provisions
specifying definite answers to comparatively unimportant questions. This
must be so, he explains, because the very point of the argument is that we
agree on these answers, or at least we are willing to accept them, and we can
agree only on relatively minor matters where the stakes are low and any
plausible settlement is good enough for government work.9 In earlier
scholarship on which this book is based, Strauss explains this idea as an
instance of conventionalism – “the notion that it is more important that some
things be settled than that they be settled right.”10 He offers numerical
illustrations: the provisions in Articles I and II prescribing age requirements
and fixed terms for federal officers.
Strauss doesn’t contend that these and other definite settlements in the text
must form our common ground because their specificity makes it necessary to
adopt a formal amendment to make a change. Originally, for example, the
default date for Congress’ initial meeting was the first Monday in December.
We changed it by amendment to January 3.11 The need for that amendment
only proves that good-enough answers win consensus support only when, and
as long as, there are no strong reasons for adopting an alternative.12
It’s fair to ask whether a consensus on unimportant constitutional choices is
sufficient to establish a genuine common ground that unites us in a single
enterprise, which then proceeds on its own shaped by common law
methodology. We can easily beef up the list. There are certainly other places
where the fact of a settlement is convenient but its content is not. We need a
way to break ties in the Senate, and authorizing the Vice President to do so is
probably as good an answer as any.13 We need a presiding officer when an
impeached President goes on trial, and drafting the Chief Justice for that
service seems unobjectionable.14 But when we tote up these and other
illustrations, I wonder whether the whole is any more than the sum of its parts.
To put the point another way, I wonder whether the good-enough answers
the written Constitution supplies conform to any pattern, far less a pattern
9
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demonstrating the common ground we’re looking for. Notice that in many
respects the document forgoes definite settlements we might have expected it
to provide. The arrangements for the election of senators and representatives
are left to the discretion of state legislatures or Congress.15 And Congress
alone has discretion to fix the time for choosing the electors who will select the
President.16 Notice, too, that the written Constitution provides some fairly
definite settlements that almost certainly don’t enjoy widespread support
today. The electoral college is the usual illustration. But over the last year lots
of us have begun to question the wisdom of requiring the Congress to assemble
every year and barring either the House or the Senate from adjourning for long
without the consent of the other. I needn’t say what the public would think
about a provision requiring us to pay members of Congress for their services
(if there were any such provision).
Strauss insists that the value we get from the written Constitution derives
from its text. He doesn’t kiss the book and pass on. He assigns words real
work to do. Sometimes, he explains, the written Constitution “decides” issues
without benefit of common law analysis.17 More fundamentally, the language
in the document plays a role in every instance. “[O]ne of the absolute fixed
points of our legal culture is that we cannot . . . say that the text of the
Constitution doesn’t matter.”18 “We cannot make an argument for any
constitutional principle without purporting to show, at some point, that the
principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution.”19
Strauss explains that the “common law approach” entails giving the words
in the written document their “ordinary, current meaning.”20 If I understand
him correctly, this goes for all the words – both words used in particularistic
provisions that make up our common ground and words used in more general
provisions from which common law analysis proceeds. He explains that
current meaning trumps historical meaning because, after all, “[t]he idea is to
find common ground on which people can agree today.”21 That suggests
provisions that settle minor points well enough to gather consensus support.
Yet Strauss goes immediately on to a discussion of a protean provision (the
Sixth Amendment) and demonstrates that assigning current meaning allows
common law methodology to reach results consistent with modern
predilections.
With respect to the definite settlements that make up common ground,
giving the words of the text their “ordinary, current meaning” is not so easy.
Bracket the postmodern insight that words have no significance at all apart
15
16
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from what the reader, any reader, chooses to attach to them. As I understand
him, Strauss takes the conventional position that words can convey meaning,
and he would acknowledge (I think) that the meaning words convey depends
on the context in which they are used. His argument is that, under the common
law approach, the proper context is the one that current understandings provide
– not the historical context that originalists insist upon.22 With respect to
definite settlements, accordingly, the idea must be (I think) that we have
widespread consensus about the meaning of the words in which those
settlements are stated, as we now understand the context in which they appear.
The form this agreement about context takes is the purpose we think words
have in the place we find them.
Take one of Strauss’ concrete examples of a textual provision that makes a
particular decision well enough to draw general modern support and thus to
form part of the common ground on which so much turns: the provision in
Article II specifying the 35-year age requirement for becoming President.23
Strauss doesn’t say what purpose he thinks we currently assign to this. But he
must think we do agree on its purpose, else we can’t subscribe to the choice of
35 years as an acceptable rule. Trouble is, there is more than one plausible
purpose to choose.
One is that an age requirement ensures that anybody who gets to be
President is mature enough to do the job. A 35-year rule serves that purpose
well enough. There are others. Akhil Amar contends that the original purpose
was to keep the sons of well-known fathers from trading on their family names
to obtain office despite their lack of merit.24 The 35-year rule served that
purpose pretty well, too, by postponing “famous son” campaigns until other,
more capable candidates could prove their worth. Moreover, the age
requirement worked in tandem with the four-year term for elected Presidents –
preventing a sitting President from hanging on until his son could be anointed
his successor. English kings sometimes managed that trick. But in this
country, so the argument goes, nobody could stay in office long enough to hold
the place for a son who could not run until after he was 35 years old.25
Multiple purposes pose a quandary for Strauss. To make the 35-year age
requirement serve as an element of our common ground, he has to explain it as
resolving a matter in our minds now and resolving it well enough to win
acceptance despite disagreements that (we agree) aren’t worth the candle to
sort out. To do that, he must explain what that matter is, this is to say what
question requires resolution but admits of an imperfect answer. If we don’t
know what problem an age requirement for the presidency addresses, we can’t
know that the 35-year rule supplies a good-enough settlement – which, in turn,
joins with other definite settlements of other minor issues to create a common
22
23
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ground, which, in turn, opens the way for us to make what we will out of the
rest of the Constitution. It may be that, at this point, Strauss allows for some
attention to original understanding after all. He says that with respect to
relatively unimportant questions like this, “[t]he text and the original
understandings are natural places to look for a solution.”26 But to go that route
is to abandon his otherwise sweeping rejection of originalism as a means of
arriving at constitutional meaning.
I have pushed this last point pretty far. The principal argument Strauss
makes about the written Constitution is that it offers points of departure for
common law development. He insists only that the results we reach on
constitutional questions today must be “consistent” with the text – not that our
results must follow from the text in the hard, interpretive way that originalists
have in mind. I can live with this. The point here is merely that when it comes
to the minor matters Strauss thinks the document resolves via definite, goodenough rules, the connection between the results we reach and the language the
text employs is supposed to be fairly tight, thus to justify adherence to the
original document because it supplies our common ground.
III
I said at the outset that the proper mission of legal theory is explanatory. In
that spirit, Professor Strauss devotes his attention to the American
constitutional scheme as it exists now. He explains that a living Constitution is
“an attribute of a mature society, one in which precedents and traditions have
had an opportunity to develop and evolve.”27 He has nothing to do with the
way constitutional principles “get established in the first place.”28 It would be
grossly unfair, then, to complain that Strauss fails to address any changes he
would recommend in our familiar, occasionally amended, 1789 document.
It must also be said that Strauss seizes a certain advantage. He begins in the
middle of things and describes what he sees from our vantage point today. I do
wonder whether what he has to say about the Constitution we have created in
this country bears on the kind of foundational document we would choose if
we were to begin again with the purpose of laying the groundwork for common
law evolution. Let’s be purely and artificially normative for a moment and
consider what an original document should look like if it is to promote the
development of a Constitution that is both alive and well. I take it we can
proceed from some overlapping premises.
We can posit that the existing document has, in fact, fostered a living
Constitution without proposing that the content of this document is optimal for
the purpose. So far as I can see, Strauss makes no such claim. If we had the
drafting task to do over again, we wouldn’t necessarily scan the written
Constitution we have and click on “copy.” We wouldn’t necessarily start with
26
27
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this document and edit it into shape. We might begin again on a clean slate
and try to fashion provisions even better suited to the living Constitution
project.
We can also identify a living Constitution as our goal without abandoning
all hope for a viable society. I will be blunt about this. The governmental
system that has taken shape in the United States is a monstrous failure. Under
its aegis, we have plundered the natural environment, killed or maimed
countless people in this country and abroad, driven great numbers of others
into poverty, and treated a favored few (like everyone at this conference) to a
style of life with comforts checked only by the certain knowledge that things
cannot go on this way much longer. Mostly, these miseries flow from our
selfish culture. Yet our basic law bears some of the blame. We have a
Constitution that celebrates personal avarice, parochialism, and short-term
interests to the exclusion of any sense of the public good. Realistically
speaking, it’s probably too late to save ourselves, or even to save the planet
from ourselves. The Constitution is a suicide pact.29 Even so, in this academic
setting, we may pause to consider whether we might have done better if our
living Constitution had emerged from a different organic document. The
optimistic among us may contemplate whether a better written Constitution
might yet help us find a way out of the fix we’ve gotten ourselves into.
We must acknowledge some facts of life. Any talk of writing a good
original document is hypothetical to a fault. The drafting task calls for sober
judgment about the ideal and brackets all the reasons why sober judgment is
most unlikely to be exercised. As the man says, constitutions aren’t written in
cold blood. They are written hard upon violent conflicts when factions that
recently laid down their arms are trying to consolidate their positions. The
drafting table is another battlefield, a little less risky to physical health but
dangerous in all manner of other ways. Hanna Lerner contends that the
process doesn’t often identify common ground, but rather sharpens existing
divisions.30 At best, the focus is on the immediate allocation of power rather
than on any long-term arrangements that might develop if given the chance. In
other writing, Professor Strauss contends that fledgling societies typically
depend on adherence to constitutional text as a means of ensuring legitimate
political actions until stable traditions and institutions form to engender trust
independently.31
Nevertheless, Albert Blaustein reports that most of the world’s constitutions
have recently been, or soon will be, revised or drafted anew.32 Even the Brits,
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924 (1996).
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whose unwritten Constitution has served for centuries, now seem bent on
codifying their basic law in one place.33 It may be that this zeal for
foundational documents reflects a disturbing expectation that a writing can and
should command the future – the antithesis of what we have in mind. We
wouldn’t want a reassessment of the document we have to feed that
misapprehension. The point of the exercise, again, is to consider the optimal
way a document might be written to facilitate the growth of an American living
Constitution we make up as the future unfolds.
The risks entailed in any redrafting are numerous and obvious. In the best
of circumstances, the prodigal forces that have brought us to our current crisis
would invade the effort. Success would almost certainly depend on an open,
inclusive drafting process, even if the public character of the debates
accentuates differences and ends up making agreement difficult. Justus
Schönlau ascribes any legitimacy the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights may
enjoy to the open convention used to formulate its provisions.34 Not that
constitutions can’t survive if they are forged in less appealing circumstances.
General MacArthur’s lawyers banged out the initial draft of the Japanese
Constitution inside a week and presented it to the Japanese government
virtually as a fait accompli.35 Japan survived as a nation, and a pretty good
one. But few of us would propose that a constitution concocted in that way
would foster the development of a genuine living constitution for the people
concerned. Then again, it is frightening to say the least even to contemplate
Sandy Levinson’s idea.
He thinks we should commission another
constitutional convention with a mandate to examine everything now in place
and to fix anything that needs fixing.36
Setting aside the difficulty of choosing the right drafting process, the
challenge of selecting the content of the document we seek would be ever so
much more baffling. One can imagine that the ideal written Constitution
would describe the system’s architecture. We might ponder whether we really
want the national government to be divided even roughly into three functional
spheres, whether we want to cordon off regions of the country into units, and,
certainly, whether we want individual units to have any sort of autonomy or,
instead, to be arms of the national government. These are controversial
questions. Malcolm Feeley and Ed Rubin have shown, for example, that

33
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federalism has little affirmative value to offer and is best understood as an
historically expedient but flawed means of mitigating internal divisions along
regional lines.37 We have federalism only because the states wouldn’t accede
to a more functional form of government.38
Consider, too, that structural relationships have evolved considerably by dint
of the living Constitution we want to promote. The power of the Executive has
expanded, the Judiciary has moved over to make room for the Administrative
State, and Congress (alas, Congress) has become essentially dysfunctional.
The place of the states has also changed dramatically, of course. Moreover,
developments at this level are connected. One reason Congress can’t legislate
effectively in the national interest is that every state gets two senators, each of
whom gets one vote – an arrangement that notoriously distributes power and
wealth to lightly populated states west of the Mississippi.39 Nor are changes in
these quarters at an end. Allocations of power are constantly shifting and
doubtless will move in surprising ways in the future. As the Executive Branch
in this country has consolidated its position, many structural changes in the
United Kingdom have come at the expense of executive authority.40 If we try
so much as to outline the framework of American government, we risk
hobbling the emergence of better public mechanisms to deal with an
unknowable future.
Many drafting projects around the globe center on identifying and
describing individual rights. Schönlau reports that drawing up the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights was thought to be essential to establishing the
legitimacy of the EU itself.41 One should think that democracy and individual
rights go hand in hand, the one enabling majoritarian sentiments largely to
prevail and the other checking the popular impulse to crush nonconformity.
Still, some sophisticated observers question the wisdom of putting individual
rights first and foremost. Levinson, for example, doubts that anything in a
written Constitution can protect individuals effectively and for long.42 For
him, it is most important to create political structures that ensure the ability of
the people to elect their own government and hold it to account. Then, he
thinks, we can anticipate that in a serious discussion the majority will be

37 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 151 (2008).
38 See John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 799, 816 (1961).
39 See LEVINSON, supra note 36, at 59-60.
40 BOGDANOR, supra note 33, at 289.
41 SCHÖNLAU, supra note 34, at 3.
42 Sanford Levinson, Do Constitutions Have a Point? Reflections on “Parchment
Barriers” and Preambles, in WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS DO? 150, 153 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 2011).
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persuaded to recognize and retain any individual rights that are truly
essential.43
Our current written Constitution offers a poor model regarding individual
rights. It’s hard to think that, starting over again, we would pick the peculiar
list in the Bill of Rights, which was so plainly tied to recent experience.
Today, a good case could be made for articulating “positive” rights of a rather
more immediate import – like rights to food, shelter, and medical care.44
Recall, too, that the living Constitution we have respects individual rights with
only the most tenuous links to the document in the Archives. To improve on
that record, we may want to avoid specifying rights in any particulars, the
better to leave their development to courts employing common law
methodology. Strauss, for his part, contends that the text always matters as a
touchstone. It wouldn’t do if the written Constitution’s provisions were
entirely open-ended.45 By his account, we need enough text to supply an initial
reference point, even if it doesn’t (and shouldn’t) channel the thinking of
courts actually fashioning the living Constitution by common law means. One
of his examples is Gideon v. Wainwright, where the Supreme Court had the
benefit of a textual wrinkle that almost certainly appears in the Sixth
Amendment only by coincidence.46
Of course, no one would propose that, writing on a clean slate, we should
spell out individual rights arbitrarily merely to supply the living Constitution
with words to chew into something worthwhile. This last point only flags
another dilemma. If we began again in an effort to nurture a living
Constitution, we would soon realize that suitable language to describe
individual rights is hard to come by.
All these starting-over problems are daunting to say the least. So maybe it’s
just as well that theorists’ primary task is to explain things as they stand in our
own time, leaving for another day the problems we would face at the dawn of a
new constitutional order.
******
David Strauss’ book is a jewel. It is intelligent, stimulating, exciting, and
sensible at one and the same time. Into the bargain, the book is manageable to
the ordinary but serious reader who genuinely wants to know something about
the Constitution we really have – that is, the Constitution we have made for
ourselves.
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